State’s Involuntary Commitment Law Ruled Unconstitutional

10-16-15 Florida:

A federal appeals court has ruled that a Florida law dealing with the involuntary commitment of people with intellectual disabilities violates constitutional due-process rights.

The ruling by the 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals stems from a man identified only by the initials J.R. who has an IQ of 56 and functions as a 7-year-old. In 2000, he was charged with sexual battery in Lee County but was later found incompetent to stand trial and was involuntarily sent to a non-secure residential facility.

Attorneys for J.R. filed a lawsuit against the state Agency for Persons with Disabilities in 2011 because they said Florida law allows indefinite involuntary commitment without periodic reviews by judges. The ruling said a circuit judge has not held a hearing on J.R.’s commitment since 2005.

A federal district judge upheld the constitutionality of the state law, but the appeals court disagreed.

“A state must release a person who is involuntarily committed if the grounds for his commitment cease to exist. But that requirement — release the committed when they deserve to be let out — is toothless if a state does not periodically review whether the grounds for commitment are met,” Thursday’s ruling said. “That is, a state could get around the timely-release requirement by simply refusing to ever consider the continued propriety of commitment. To effectuate that requirement, then, the state must undertake some form of periodic review.” ..Source.. by CBSLocal.com

Sharkey v O'Neal

2-15-15 California:

Sharkey v O'Neal
Dennis Sharkey appeals from an order of the district court dismissing as time-barred his claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and various provisions of the Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district judge applied California's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims to all of Sharkey's claims. With respect to Sharkey's claim under Title II of the ADA, we hold that the district court did not apply the correct statute of limitations.

District courts must borrow the three-year limitations period applicable to claims under California Government Code § 11135, rather than the limitations period applicable to personal injury claims in California. Under this three-year limitations period, Sharkey's ADA claim is not time-barred. With respect to his other claims, Sharkey does not contest the applicable limitations periods, but we hold that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint with prejudice without affording Sharkey leave to amend.

BACKGROUND

Sharkey is a 55–year–old man with disabilities that require him to use a wheelchair and two canes. In late 2006 and early 2007, Defendants Graham, Foster, O'Neal, and Sydney were employees at the Parole Division of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation in Berkeley.

In 2006, Sharkey was on parole, living independently in an accessible apartment in Oakland. On December 28, 2006, Agent Foster informed Sharkey of new parole terms, including a housing restriction imposed under the California Sexual Predator and Control Act (Prop 83) that required Sharkey to move from his Oakland residence. Agent O'Neal, who Agent Foster had assigned to Sharkey's case, gave Sharkey only an hour to relocate and only 25 minutes to pack, notwithstanding his disability. Sharkey experienced a great deal of pain during this harried move, and, due to the time pressure, left behind important medical supplies and personal possessions. Agent O'Neal forbade Sharkey from ever returning to the apartment or from calling friends to retrieve his remaining belongings.

That night, Agent O'Neal drove Sharkey to the Harris Motel and assigned him to a room that lacked the safety features necessary to accommodate his disability, such as a wheelchair-accessible entrance, sufficient floor space to operate a wheelchair, and bathroom grab bars. When Sharkey complained to Agent Foster, no attempt was made to locate a suitable residence.

USA v THE COUNTY OF ALAMEDA SHERIFF’S OFFICE

2-5-2015 National:

I. PURPOSE

1. It is the intent of the United States Department of Justice (“the United States” or “the Department”) and the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office (“Sheriff’) (collectively, “Parties”) that this Settlement Agreement shall resolve all issues associated with the provision of effective communication with persons who are deaf, hard of hearing, and deaf-blind so that they may participate in or benefit from the services, programs, or activities of the Sheriff on an equal basis with other individuals, including but not limited to arrestees, detainees, suspects, victims, witnesses, complainants, and visitors at Santa Rita Jail (“SRJ”) and Glenn E. Dyer Jail (“GDJ”) (collectively “detention facilities”). This Agreement establishes the Sheriff’s obligations to provide appropriate auxiliary aids and services whenever necessary to ensure effective communications with qualified individuals with a disability at SRJ and GDJ detention facilities, including inmates, visitors, and members of the public with disabilities.

II. BACKGROUND

2. This Settlement Agreement originated with a complaint lodged with the United States against the Sheriff. The complaint alleged that the Sheriff violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134, and the Department’s regulation implementing Title II, 28 C.F.R. Part 35, by denying effective communication with a qualified individual with a disability. In his complaint, Mr. Bonner, who is deaf and blind, alleged that the Sheriff failed to provide him with a tactile interpreter when necessary to ensure effective communication with him when he was arrested and during his two day incarceration at SRJ. Mr. Bonner was released from SRJ after the charges against him were dropped.